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It was always a safe bet that the occasion of the new Millennium would be used by academic disciplines as an opportunity to ask how they can redefine and reaffirm their core aims, to decide how they can regain a sense of a common purpose, and to develop a higher and more respected profile in public life. Having seen such questions raised in several disciplines - and sometimes even set as essay titles for poor students - I have to say such exercises fill me with gloom and despondency. I believe we should celebrate rather than mourn the decline of disciplines. We should encourage the development of not merely interdisciplinary but 'postdisciplinary studies'. 

The identification which so many academics have with their disciplines is actually counterproductive in relation to making progress in understanding society. In the first place, disciplines are parochial: their members tend to be incapable of seeing beyond the questions posed by their own discipline, which provide an all-purpose filter for everything.  Where the identity and boundaries of a discipline are strongly asserted and policed, it can stifle scholarship and innovation. One of the worst manifestations of this is the production of lists of 'recognized' journals, as in economics, which are considered as acceptable places in which to publish by the Research Assessment Exercise in its grading of British university departments. It is bad enough that economics - the home of believers in free, unregulated competition - should allow this exclusionary monopoly practice. It would be disastrous if this practice were to spread to other social sciences.

Secondly, disciplines are also often imperialist: they attempt to claim territories occupied by others as their own. A well-known example is that of public choice theory in economics, which claims to be able to explain things like politics and marriage, as well as the functioning of economies. Disciplinary imperialism is closely related to disciplinary parochialism because both inhibit thinking outside the framework of a single discipline. Both are evident in the tendency for accounts of the world to be assessed not merely in terms of their explanatory adequacy, but in terms of the extent to which they further the aims of the discipline, and use its favoured tropes.

This imperialism  and parochialism is easy to see in others, but it is harder for disciplinarians to see it in their own behaviour. Faced with any attractive theoretical innovation, we should always ask whether it is attractive because it is a good explanation of the phenomenon concerned or because it seems to enlarge the claims of the discipline. Public choice theory in economics is again an outstanding example. When economists say they can explain the structure and dynamics of families or suicide by reference to a rational choice methodology, does this appeal to them because it's a better explanation than rival ones, or because it reinforces their discipline's imperialism, its imagined omnipotence? Apparently, non-economists don't realise such things are explicable in terms of rational choice: the economists do, and they understand this best. Similarly, when sociologists say science has to be understood as a social construction, does this appeal because it is a better explanation of science, or because it advances sociological imperialism? (The latter answer should naturally be the preferred answer for those sociologists of science who believe epistemological authority is merely social authority in disguise.)

Each discipline likes to flatter itself that it is more fundamental than all the others. Thus, we have sociology as a 'second-order' discipline which produces 'social theory', concerned not with first order substantive empirical questions such as 'how are families in Britain changing?', but with more abstract issues, like those of social ontology - for example, the structure-agency relationship, or time and action - where social theory merges into the philosophy of social science. These are perfectly good things to study, but part of their attraction is surely that they give the impression that sociology is so much broader than any of the other disciplines, and capable of studying anything. 

Disciplines can greatly extend their territorial claims by shifting from grounding themselves in a topic or object of study to identifying themselves in terms of ways of seeing: economics is not just the study of economies, it's a way of understanding every aspect of society, through the lens of rational choice​[1]​ ; geography is an all-encompassing subject which shows how everything comes together in space, so that nothing eludes its synthesizing gaze.

Note, however, that despite these criticisms, I do accept that disciplines ask important questions. But these are abstract - that is, one-sided - questions; for example, about the problem of social order, or the relationship between society and environment. They are certainly worthwhile issues, but to answer them we need concrete answers that go beyond the bounds of single disciplines. For example, to take a longstanding, prime concern of sociology - the problem of order: dealing with concrete instances of how and why societies are ordered is likely to require us to consider psychological matters, the workings of markets, and the spatial organization of society. Consequently we have to go beyond sociology in order to answer one of its most fundamental questions. Likewise, in human geography, in order to understand the spatial organization of economies, researchers need to go back into economic and political matters to understand what produces that spatial organization. Similarly, in economics, in order to understand concrete instances of economic processes, such as those of East Asian capitalism, we need to understand the ways in which economic practices are socially embedded and politically regulated. Of course, economics is notorious for either ignoring the concrete in order to protect its closed system models from counter-evidence, or treating the concrete as reducible to the relationships identified in the abstract models (Lawson 1997; Sayer 1992).

Moving from abstract questions, many of which historically have been the special concern of particular disciplines, to studies of concrete societies, therefore typically requires us to ignore disciplinary boundaries, and follow the ideas and processes wherever they lead. However, progress in this direction is usually limited by disciplinary priorities. 

Consider three examples of disciplinary parochialism and imperialism, the first substantive, the second and third methodological or meta-theoretical.

1. In sociology, the grand narrative of Fordism and post-Fordism functions as a way in which the discipline can - as Terry Eagleton once pointed out -  deal with economic matters without having to know any more about economics than is needed to read the business pages of the paper. It allows a sociologically imperialist claim to economic knowledge that is impervious to external critique. It functions as a grand narrative into which many sociologists seem to feel obliged to fit their empirical analyses of anything economic. Extraordinarily, it has become an account of contemporary economies which rarely makes any mention of costs and cash. The fortunes of firms comes to depend not on the bottom line but on their conformity to the post-Fordist model and their development of new work cultures, the extent to which they embrace networks, etc. Some of these things might indeed influence their success, but the dynamics of costs which economists prioritise cannot be reduced to these, and can work in quite different directions. Sociologists rightly insist that economic relations are socially or culturally embedded, but that doesn't say everything about them, indeed much eludes such a perspective. Significantly, economists and other students of businesses tend to be a good deal less impressed by the narrative of Fordism and post-Fordism than are sociologists. Equally, while there may be something in the claim that post-Fordism is as much a cultural as an economic concept, it would be naive not to note that this sort of claim is also typical of power struggles over intellectual territories and the right to speak about them.

2. The second example is more methodological, relating to strong versions of social constructionism and the psychology/sociology relation. Ian Craib has been a longstanding critic of sociological imperialism, in the form of its denial of the internal world, and the 'I', which psychology and psychoanalysis attempt to understand (Craib 1989; see also Gorz 1989). Our ability to receive something from outside and make it our own, that is, to make something out of the materials and influences through which we are constructed, thus creating something different, has always caused problems for sociology, given its prioritising of social relations (Craib 1997): ‘To be a sociologist is often to engage in, implicitly or explicitly, a more or less immense, more or less manic denial of the internal world, and attempt to avoid an inner reality’ (1989: 196).

Disciplinary boundaries tend to get positioned in a way which allows each discipline to externalise difficult problems, indeed they often deny that there is anything they need to know about on the other side of the boundary. Thus economists treat the determination of consumer preferences and demand as either a given or something which is a matter for psychology and sociology. That preferences might also be influenced by economic processes themselves is particularly threatening for neoclassical economics because it undermines its extravagant claim that markets allow the consumer to be sovereign. For more technical reasons, challenging the exogenous status of preferences would also undermine much of the massive theoretical edifice of neoclassical economics (Penz 1986). In similar fashion, many sociologists avoid the interface with psychology by various means which deny the 'I' and treat agents as tabula rasa awaiting social construction. 

Strong versions of social constructionism imply sociological omnipotence or triumphalism: not only is everything, including what others imagine to be at least co-authored by themselves, actually a social construction, but sociologists can see this so much more clearly than anyone else. However, though they may kill off 'the subject', and by implication, authors, they of course have to exempt themselves from the death sentence; presumably their own work is not wholly reducible to an externally-produced social construction. Such absurdities are likely to arise wherever compatibility with disciplinary ambitions and priorities becomes a conscious or subconscious criterion for the acceptance of proposed explanations.

3. Disciplinary imperialism/parochialism in sociology often takes the form of sociological reductionism. By this I mean the tendency to treat ideas and practices as if the only thing we needed to know about them was their social coordinates, be it 'middle class', 'feminine', 'high culture', or whatever, as if this determined their content and obviated the need to assess that content. To use an example given by Bourdieu, those who dismiss feminism as 'middle class' are guilty of sociological reductionism. We quite rightly regard it as insulting to treat feminists as merely responding to their class position rather than having ideas which need to be considered in their own right. It's like dismissing someone's argument by saying 'you would say that wouldn't you?' However, as we shall see, Bourdieu appears as both an opponent and a exponent of sociological reductionism (Sayer 1999).

Reasoning or reflection can enable us to think beyond the dispositions we have acquired through having a particular location in the social field. It is even possible to arrive at ways of thinking and acting which are at odds with those dispositions, as did Marx despite his middle class background, though of course reasoning might lead us to affirm our dispositions. At the same time, as Bourdieu argues, unless we rigorously question our own dispositions and position within the social field we are unlikely to break their influence (Bourdieu 1993).

Consider the question of why sociologists identify so strongly with their institution - their discipline - as an example. As Bourdieu argues, when we commit ourselves to a certain game or form of life, we both make an investment from which we hope to draw profit (not necessarily monetary), and commit ourselves to its norms and rules. The institution offers certain rewards and stakes, and its members consider them worth playing for. (Of course, that we occasionally distance ourselves from the institution by making ironic comments about it doesn't at all indicate that we are independent of it.) The success of the institution and the success of its members' life projects and careers become interdependent. 

Looking at someone else's institution, it is hard not to regard their commitment to it and their belief in the game, their conformity to its rules, as rather extraordinary, as if they were living an illusion. Thus we might feel tempted to say to accountants, estate agents or chemists at one of their own conferences - how can you invest so much of yourself in something so prosaic, and identify with its petty norms, treating them as worthy standards for your life, indeed as if meeting them were your primary goal in life? All this applies to academics' attachment to their disciplines too. Bourdieu uses the term 'illusio' to characterise this situation - not so much to draw attention to the illusions but to their game-like (from the Latin ludus) character (Bourdieu 1998). 

However, Bourdieu's own commitment to sociology is not of course explained in this way. Sociologists are much happier talking in a reductionist way about others than about themselves. The example serves not only to remind us of the strangeness of disciplinary loyalties but as an illustration of sociologically reductionist accounts of them. Typically, sociologists rely too heavily on sociological explanations of others, and not enough on them for their own behaviour; if the working class eat out, they eat at Kentucky Fried Chicken or MacDonalds because of their class or habitus, but we academics choose where to eat out according to the quality of the food and atmosphere.

In other words, in our first person accounts we tend to explain what we do by means of justifications for our actions. We play sociology or whatever because it is worth playing. But they play whatever they play because of their social position. This radical difference between sociologists' accounts of the behaviour of others and that of their own is one of the outstanding peculiarities of the discipline. 

We could, of course, respond by admitting the social influences upon our judgements, showing how they are what one would expect given our habitus (as Bourdieu does, with regard to his own tastes), but a thoroughgoing sociological reductionism would take this admission as itself a function of our habitus, and any justifications we offered of our behaviour could be dismissed, bracketed out, or treated as a function of our social position. It would be like saying - 'don't bother to listen to my arguments, it's only my habitus talking'.

However, one way out of the dilemma is to admit that while habitus is certainly significant, those we study are - like us - capable of acting not merely on the basis of their social position but on the basis of their reasoning, which can take them beyond those social influences. Discourses always extend beyond particular social locations and are open to interpretation from a range of positions, and reasoning involves processes of extension, generalization, and critical reflection, all of which means that the social influences of particular locations can be brought into question and overridden (Alexander 1995). To deny this is to fall into something akin to behaviourism and a crude correspondence theory of the relationship of discourses to contexts. This is not to deny the power of habitus but merely to note its limitations, and acknowledge that habitus can be partially transcended. 

Thus to know how far sociological explanations can be taken, we have to decide how far things can not be explained sociologically. In one of Bourdieu's books on education -  The State Nobility, he analyses the relationship between students' parental occupation and the kinds of comments tutors give them on their essays, showing that positive comments vary directly with class. Only after well over 100 pages does he acknowledge that the comments might be responding to differences in the quality of the essays, and that this might well vary with class too. But I would suggest that his coyness about admitting that the marks might have something to do with whether the students got certain things right or not, derives from a reluctance to acknowledge the limits to sociological explanation. Again: to know how far sociologically reductionist explanations do work we have to assess how far they don't work. (Equally, to know how far actors' judgements are 'interested', in Bourdieu's use of the term, we need to know how far they are not interested.)

Of course, sociological reductionism might simply be defended in disciplinary terms - that it's only appropriate for sociologists to restrict themselves to analysing the social coordinates of judgements, tastes, opinions, actions, etc. Bourdieu himself defends such a position. For such a radical thinker he is surprisingly attached to his discipline, defending sociology, arguing that like any other discipline it should push its questions as far as possible so as to challenge others. In Sociology in Question, he even says that ‘every science has to use its own means to account for the greatest number of things possible, including things that are apparently or really explained by other sciences.’ (1993: 25). As our discussion of sociological reductionism showed, such imperialism invites misexplanation through misattribution of causality.

Earlier, I noted the way in which disciplinary imperialism often involves moves towards adopting higher levels of abstraction. As Bourdieu would no doubt point out, such moves, taking researchers away from the first-order realm of mundane empirical matters, can enhance their cultural capital; the second order level is not only 'more theoretical', it is also posh. The academic 'field' is also a social field, and academics tend to gravitate to the parts of the academic field that correspond to their social class position (Bourdieu 1988). At the same time, the field is one of struggle for cultural capital, and the imperialist ambitions of disciplines tend to point up-market. To be sure, these are just generalizations, to which there are plenty of exceptions. However, if academics want to be reflexive, and to avoid being class-blind - all the more necessary where class is 'non-grata' (Barrett 1982) - they need to be aware of these social influences.  Again, recognition of these influences does not license a sociological reductionism in which the intellectual, practical and political importance of particular studies, be they first order or second order, becomes a function of their social correlates. On the contrary, awareness of the class correlations of disciplinary shifts is important for enabling us to prevent them influencing our judgements of the intellectual value of particular moves in scholarship and research, wherever their exponents may be situated in the social field (Sayer 1999).

Of course, interdisciplinary exchanges can have hidden agendas too and be driven at least partly by attempts of participants to raise their status. An outstanding example of this is cultural studies. This derived from the interchange over the last two decades between literary studies and social theory, through which both increased their cultural capital, the former through gaining the prestige of theory, the latter through gaining that of literary culture. Together, and surely partly as a consequence of this enhanced cultural capital, they had some success in deflating the standing of rival disciplines such as philosophy and more economistic social studies. 

Why postdisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary studies? Interdisciplinary studies are not enough, for at worst they provide a space in which members of different disciplines can bring their points of view together in order to compete behind a thin disguise of cooperation, with the result that the researchers don't actually escape from their home disciplines. At best interdisciplinary studies merely offers the prospect of an escape from disciplinary constraints. 

Postdisciplinary studies emerge when scholars forget about disciplines and whether ideas can be identified with any particular one; they identify with learning rather than with disciplines. They follows ideas and connections wherever they lead instead of following them only as far as the border of their discipline. It therefore does not invite dilettantism or eclecticism, in which we end up doing a lot of things badly. On the contrary, it differs from those things precisely because it requires us to follow connections. One can still study a coherent group of phenomenon; in fact, since one is not dividing it up and selecting out elements appropriate to a particular discipline, it can be more coherent than conventional disciplinary studies.

It's common to say one can only do interdisciplinary studies after one has first got a good grounding in a particular discipline. This is a kind of holding position for conservatives, involving minimal compromise: it also reduces the chances of those who go on to attempt interdisciplinary studies of leaving their discipline. Having formerly taught 17 years at a university​[2]​ where undergraduates are introduced to interdisciplinary courses for half of their studies from the start, I would challenge the conservative view; if people work on a coherent group of topics or problems without regard for disciplinary boundaries long enough and a postdisciplinary literature builds up, then that can provide a basis for teaching. Urban and regional studies is a good example of this. A well-known example of postdisciplinary studies from 10 years ago - and one relating partly to urban and regional studies - is David Harvey's book The Condition of Postmodernity (Harvey 1987). 

However, there are also some well-known examples from 150, even 250 years ago, though of course these were pre-disciplinary studies. Disciplines are, after all. a relatively recent phenomenon. Before the late nineteenth century, the founders of social science would roam freely across territory we now see carefully fenced off into politics, psychology, sociology, economics, philosophy, etc. - indeed they would often do so within a single page. A good example of this was Adam Smith. Though now commonly claimed by economists as their founder, he was of course a professor of moral philosophy. He was greatly concerned with the problem of social order, and so might be claimed by sociologists as their founder, but unlike most contemporary sociologists he did not attempt to exclude connections to psychology but tried to inter-relate psychological dispositions and social relations - in both directions, avoiding both psychological reductionism and sociological reductionism. For Smith, economic relations, including market ones, were always embedded in social relations, and he saw the formation of consumer preferences as very much culturally influenced. In other words, unlike contemporary economists, he didn't attempt to ignore the determination of demand or to leave it to others to study as if it was conveniently exogenous. At the same time, the concept of an invisible hand guiding market behaviour resists the reduction of the mechanisms determining the division of labour to a matter of the social embedding of economic relations, as a sociologically reductionist treatment would imply.

It is ironic that disciplines should try to claim particular founders of social science as part of their own canon, when the strength of so many of them owed much to the fact that they were not inhibited by disciplinary self-censorship. While many of the old canon were pre-disciplinary, many who might form a new canon are postdisciplinary. To discipline a Marx or a Foucault is to diminish them. For example, to attempt to select out 'Marx the sociologist' - is to fail to understand his critique of political economy; worse, to reduce him to the status of a proto-theorist of social stratification - is to render him uninteresting. We should resist the temptation to see the work of pre-disciplinary theorists as teleologically leading to the development of  particular disciplines. It follows from this that the advocacy of postdisciplinary studies should not be seen as antithetical to the idea of the canon, but as a way of responding more sympathetically to the concerns of its key figures by refusing to discipline them.
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^1	   "There is only one social science. What gives economics its imperialist invasive power is that our analytical categories - scarcity, cost, preferences, opportunities, etc. - are truly universal in applicability" (Hirschleifer, 1985, p.66, quoted in O'Neill, 1998).
^2	  University of Sussex, U.K.
